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Abstract
We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow can-
didates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited,
then a unique equilibrium regarding the position choices of candidates would
exist. With unrestricted ﬁnancing of political campaigns two equilibria emerge,
depending on whether a majority of interest groups runs to support the leftist or
rightist candidate. The equilibria generate a variety of new features of campaign
games and may help identify the objective functions of candidates empirically.
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Competitive political campaigns are still a very controversial issue. Discussions on this
subject relate both to the inﬂuence of campaigns on political outcomes and to their
impact on welfare.
In this paper we propose a model of political campaigns that allows us to study the
interdependence between campaign expenditures, candidates’ positions, and electoral
outcomes. We focus on the following often-observed political races. At the beginning
of a political race for oﬃce, two candidates try to obtain campaign support from
interest groups. They announce positions in a policy space that are more risky the
more they diﬀer from positions announced in the past. One candidate has a ﬁrmly
established position on the left of the political spectrum and the same holds for the
other candidate, who has a ﬁrmly established position on the right side. Moreover, an
incumbent may have a clearer position than a challenger because he has been in oﬃce
for a long time, and thus has been able to build up reputation. Voters are risk-averse
and the candidates will try to improve communication with them during campaigns in
order to reduce location uncertainty which, in turn, allows them to move their political
positions towards the current median position. Fund-raising is a necessary condition for
getting messages across, so candidates will attempt to obtain campaign contributions
at the beginning of the political race to gain mobility within the political spectrum.
Candidates maximize their vote shares.
We study the equilibria of this game and shed light on the role of political campaigns.
Our main results are as follows: We ﬁrst show that there is a unique equilibrium
regarding the position choices of candidates if interest group donations are prohibited.
The game with interest group donations essentially brings forth two equilibria. Each
candidate’s chance of winning the election depends on the equilibrium that is realized.
The winning candidate, uniquely determined in one equilibrium, is usually located
closer to the median position and receives contributions from a majority of donors.
An important feature of our equilibria is the presence of a certain run on donors’
contributions. A donor1 may contribute money to one candidate in one equilibrium
and support the other candidate in the other equilibrium. As a consequence, even if
candidates’ initial positions and the ideal points of interest groups are symmetrically
distributed around the median, the political positions chosen in equilibrium will be
asymmetric.
1E.g. a donor located close to the median voter.
2Moreover, we demonstrate that donors may support a candidate whose position is not
very close to their own ideal point in order to draw the position of the winning candidate
towards their own ideal points. Suppose, for example, that the rightist candidate wins
the election. Then, in our model, donors to the right of the winning rightist candidate
give money to the leftist candidate, as this pushes the equilibrium position of the
rightist candidate towards the right. Donors located around the median, however, will
support the winning candidate. Constellations in which interest groups support the
candidate on the other side of the political spectrum are observed in political races.
For instance, in 1994 in Germany, industry organizations contributed a large amount of
campaign money to the left-wing Social Democrats (see Gersbach and Liessem (2002)).
Further, the candidates do not adopt the median position in the equilibria. However,
campaigns lead to a partial convergence of positions towards the preferred position by
the median voter, in comparison with the corresponding equilibrium without political
advertising. Campaigns thus induce the winning position to move closer to the median
ideal position.
Our analysis also enriches the incumbent/challenger discussion. A traditional argument
suggests that incumbents are perceived with lower uncertainty than a challenger, which
implies a disadvantage for challengers if voters are risk-averse (see e.g. Bernhardt and
Ingberman (1985)). In our model, a risky challenger may defeat an incumbent if he
is able to organize donors appropriately, because if donors believe that the challenger
will win, a majority of donors will support him, thus conﬁrming their expectations.
Finally, our results in comparison with other theoretical results could be used to draw
inferences about whether candidates for public oﬃces are more interested in policies or
in winning elections. This will be developed in the concluding section.
While we perform our analysis in the framework with risk-averse voters where cam-
paigns reduce uncertainty, it is important that the same results could be obtained in a
variant of the framework suggested by Baron (1994), where voters are either informed
about intentions of parties and candidates or not, and advertising is persuasive. The
closer the ideal point of an uninformed voter is to the historical position of the candi-
date, the more such a voter reacts to campaigns and a higher amount of money enables
candidates to increase the share of voters for a given position.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we review the literature. In
section 3 we outline the model. In section 4, we characterize the equilibrium when
campaigns are absent. In section 5 we analyze the eﬀects of campaigns. In section 6,
we examine the candidate and donor equilibria and we illustrate the multiplicity by
3an example. Subsequently, we discuss extensions of the model and propose some ﬁnal
conclusions.
2 Relation to the Literature
Three types of models have been proposed for political campaigns. First, Austen-
Smith (1987) developed a model of directly informative advertising. Voters observe
candidates’ positions with noise and campaign expenditures reduce the variance of
that noise. Building on this assumption, Gersbach (1998) has developed a model of
campaigns in which the contributions help candidates to get elected because risk-averse
voters prefer candidates with a more precise policy position. Informative campaigning
in the sense of truthful revelation about policy platforms is important when redistribu-
tive policies are considered as shown by Schultz (2007). He develops an intriguing
model in which parties target campaigns on groups where most votes are gained by in-
forming about policies. As a consequence, targeted groups will become more informed
and beneﬁt most from redistribution.
Second, Gerber (1996), Potters, Sloof, and van Winden (1997), Gersbach (2004), and
Prat (2002) use non-directly informative advertising. Each candidate is characterized
by a non-policy dimension (valence) that lobbies can observe more precisely than vot-
ers. The amount of campaign money a candidate collects signals his valence to voters.
Hence the role of campaign advertising is not to convey a direct message but to cred-
ibly “burn” campaign money.2 Coate (2004 a,b) and Ashworth (2006) have further
developed the signaling approach and assume that candidates send messages to voters.
These costly messages may be equivalent to money burning but may also consist of
veriﬁable information about the characteristics of candidates. This approach has been
generalized by Vanberg (2008) to two-dimensional candidate types.
Third, Baron (1994), McKelvey and Ordeshook (1987), Grossman and Helpman (1996),
and Ortuno Ortin and Schultz (2005) distinguish between “informed” and “unin-
formed” or “impressionable” voters. The informed electorate votes according to the
policies proposed by the diﬀerent political parties (or candidates). Impressionable vot-
2A diﬀerent way of modeling campaign expenditures is found in Austen-Smith and Wright (1994)
and Austen-Smith (1995). Here lobbies make contributions in exchange for access to politicians.
Politicians care about the information that lobbies can provide them with. The extent of truthful
information transmission increases in the preference congruence between a lobby and the politician
(see Crawford and Sobel (1982)). Campaign contributions signal preference congruence and induce
candidates to grant access to the lobbies.
4ers are, however, poorly informed about the policies of the diﬀerent parties, and their
vote is directly inﬂuenced by campaign spending.3 This type of campaign is therefore
persuasive advertising.
We assume that the candidates can use funds to increase the share of voters supporting
them. This can be interpreted as persuasive advertising or as informative advertising,
where candidates use money to reduce (risk-averse) voters’ uncertainty about candi-
dates’ policy positions. We will give a precise meaning of these approaches in section
5.1. We allow for the fact that candidates’ ability to aﬀect voting by campaign ex-
penditures will diﬀer. In contrast to Gersbach (1998), who focuses on candidates with
policy preferences, we assume that candidates maximize their votes. The results thus
contrast with Gersbach (1998). In the concluding section, we discuss how this could
help to test diﬀerent theories of candidates’ and electorate’s behavior empirically.
One of our central results is that interest group donations move the political outcome
towards the median voter. The reason is that donors behave strategically. If a majority
of interest groups expect that a candidate will win, he obtains the majority of interest
group donations allowing him to move towards the center, fulﬁlling the expectations
of interest groups. This, in turn, makes the candidate attractive for a majority of vot-
ers, which conﬁrms the assumptions of interest groups. This insight is complementary
to the work of Wittman (2007 and 2008). Wittman (2008), for instance, has high-
lighted the importance of allowing uninformed voters to have counterstrategies when
advertising is directed towards other voters. When those uninformed voters who do
not receive targeted campaign adverstising respond optimally, any negative eﬀect of
pressure groups and political advertising is mitigated and the political outcome moves
towards the median voter.
3This type of campaign is similar to the persuasive advertising analyzed in economic literature, for
example Shy (1995).
53 The Model
Electoral processes exhibit many features, but they can be essentially broken down into
four stages, which include political advertising. The time pattern can be described as
follows:
Stage 1: Candidates attempt to obtain campaign support from politically active groups.
Donors spend their money to enhance the expected utilities arising for them from
election.
Stage 2: In the political strategy space, candidates choose positions that will remain
ﬁxed during the whole electoral contest. The positions are determined so as
to maximize the share of voters. The voters are only imperfectly aware of the
position choice of the candidates.
Stage 3: Candidates use their ﬁnancial support to reduce the uncertainty concerning
their position.
Stage 4: Individuals cast their votes, and the electoral outcome is determined by
majority voting.
This sequential election procedure can be observed in many countries. Consider, for
example, the primary elections in the U.S., where interest groups spend money to
inﬂuence the choice of candidates or representatives in one party and hence the ﬁnal
party position for the general election. Moreover, potential candidates for congressional
elections in the U.S. receive money and engage in fund-raising even before they have
announced their candidacy or have deﬁned a political position.
We assume that voters view two candidates (or parties) b and c as being located
somewhere on a one-dimensional political space X = [−A,A] with A > 0.
For tractability, the single-peaked utility function of voter i is given by
ui(w) = di − (w − xi)
2 (1)
di > 0 represents the maximum utility obtainable by i and xi his own most-preferred
point on the policy space X. The variable w denotes the policy a candidate pursues
in oﬃce and is either wb or wc. There is a continuum of voters represented by the
6continuous density function g(xi) and distribution function G(xi). The median voteriz
normalized to xm = 04.
The position choices of the candidates in stage 2 are denoted by xb and xc. Voters
perceive the announcements of positions by candidates as a noisy signal about the
true position and hence about the policies a winning candidate would pursue in oﬃce.
These signals are denoted by wb and wc, and diﬀer, from the voters’ point of view, from
the initially announced positions xb and xc by random variables zb and zc, wb = xb+zb
and wc = xc + zc with E(zb) = E(zc) = 0.
We allow the variance of the signal to depend on the position of the candidate. Parties
or candidates are often perceived via some form of ideological label. Accordingly, we
assume that there exists one location for each candidate where he has an absolute
advantage concerning the certainty of his position as perceived by voters. If candidates
move away from their established position, they will progressively lose the advantage
based on voter perceptions, and voters will have much greater diﬃculty in predicting
what candidates will do in oﬃce.
We use V b and V c to denote the variances of wb and wc, respectively. The dependence
on the eﬀective position of the candidates is given by
V
b = fb + kb(|xb − ˆ xb|)
V
c = fc + kc(|xc − ˆ xc|) (2)
fb, fc, kb, kc > 0
xb and xc are the positions chosen by the candidates. ˆ xb and ˆ xc denote the most ﬁrmly
established position of the candidates, that is, the location they are perceived to occupy
with the lowest uncertainty. The variables fb and fc represent irreducible uncertainty,
which we will call henceforth “ﬂoor uncertainty”. kb and kc represent the mobility
costs. Thus, if a candidate diverges from his established point, he will generate greater
uncertainty, the higher values kb or kc are, respectively. We allow that the variables
fb,fc and kb,kc diﬀer across candidates.5 Since voters are risk-averse, this makes spatial
movements costly to vote-maximizing candidates.
We assume that ˆ xb < xm = 0 < ˆ xc, which implies that we have a leftist and a rightist
candidate as in most two-candidate elections. xm is the ideal point of the median voter.
Given position choices xb and xc and associated signals wa and wb, voters derive the
4No assumption is needed regarding the mean position of voters
5For instance, if candidate b was in oﬃce in the last term, fb will typically be smaller than fc.












= di − (wc − xi)
2 − V
c (3)













V c − V b
2(wc − wb)
(4)
We will outline in section 5.1 two diﬀerent approaches regarding voter rationality that
are consistent with this model set-up. From the candidate’s perspective they recognize
that wb and wc will be unbiased signals of the platform choices xb and xc, as E[zb] =





V c − V b
2(xc − xb)
(5)
4 Candidate Equilibrium Without Campaigns
We here deduce the equilibrium without advertising which is called a candidate equi-
librium. The candidates maximize their votes. We deﬁne the position of the voter who







V c − V b
2(xc − xb)
(6)
All voters with xi < xind
i will support candidate b and voters with xi > xind
i cast their
vote vor candidate c. Vote share maximization requires that the goals of the candidates
be maxxind
i (candidate b) and minxind
i (candidate c).
In order to derive a candidate equilibrium as a Nash eauilibrium of the candidates’
platform choices, we assume interior solutions, i.e. the platform choices satisfy ˆ xb < xb
and ˆ xc > xc. Precise conditions for interior solutions will be given at the end of this
section.





8By calculation of the corresponding ﬁrst-order condition for candidate b, we obtain (see
Appendix 1)
Proposition 1
In a candidate equilibrium with interior solutions, candidates choose the following
platforms.
xc =














(kc + kb) + xb (10)
We note that the candidates choose diﬀerent positions despite the single-peakness util-
ity function of the voters. This result is caused by the fact that there is an incentive
to deviate from a common position, e.g. the median position. It is true that a spatial
movement toward more extreme positions will attract fewer voters by reason of the
distance eﬀect. But by approaching his established position a candidate reduces uncer-
tainty and gains in reputation. This will overrule the distance eﬀect if the candidates
are very close.
If the candidates quickly forfeit clarity by leaving established positions (i.e. if kc and
kb are high), the candidates will be very separately located in equilibrium. If fb = fc,
ˆ xb = −ˆ xc and kc = kb, we will arrive at xc = 1
4(kb +kc) and xb = −1
4(kb + kc) and thus
candidates are located symmetrically around the median. Moreover, we obtain:
Corollary 1






Hence, for very small values of kb and kc and symmetric locations with identical ﬂoor
uncertainty, we approach the classical median voter result.
Finally we spell out the conditions under which this equilibrium holds. We have as-
sumed interior solutions, i.e. ˆ xb < xb and xc < ˆ xc. From equation (9), the condition
9ˆ xb < xb yields6




2 > 0 (11)
Analogously, using equation (8) the condition xc < ˆ xc can be rewritten as




2 < 0 (12)
Next we turn to the investigation of campaigns. We assume throughout this paper
that (11) and (12) hold. Essentially, this requires some minimal political polarization
in comparison to mobility costs. That is, ˆ xc − ˆ xb must be suﬃciently large relative to
kb + kc and |fc − fb|.
5 The Eﬀects of Campaigns
5.1 The impact of campaigns
As discussed in Section 3, our main assumption is that campaign expenditures aﬀect
voting behavior. In our model this occurs as campaigns can reduce the mobility costs
and thus can lower the variances V b and V c. This aﬀects voting behavior and induces
candidates to adjust their platforms. We can justify the assumption that campaigns
reduce location uncertainty in two ways. First, campaigns can be interpreted as infor-
mative advertising in the sense of Austen-Smith (1987). In this approach, candidates
send repeated messages regarding their position. These messages are noisy as candi-
dates have limited control over informational intermediaries and public discussion in
general. Voters make correct assessments regarding the expected position and update
their beliefs about positions after each message. Hence, voters are Bayesian learners.
For instance, when a candidate, say b, chooses a position, he chooses an a-priori dis-
tribution with mean xb and a given variance. Campaigns are sequences of draws for
a given distribution with a known mean and unknown variance. At the end of the
campaign, voters form a-posteriori beliefs (see e.g. DeGroot (1970)) which essentially
leads to lower variance regarding the position of candidates.
One could argue that voters could derive the position of candidates with certainty if
they calculated the equilibria of the entire game. This would require an enormous
amount of knowledge as patterns of campaign contributions, distributions of ideal
6We note that it is possible that xb > 0 or xc < 0 and thus both parties may be located on the
same side of the political spectrum. As shown in Proposition 1 it is always guaranteed that xc > xb.
10points of voters, etc. need to be known. We assume that voters are not able to cal-
culate equilibria and vote accordingly. They vote sincerely and behave according to
expected utility comparisons as expressed in equations (3) and (4). We could allow
that a subset of voters are Bayesian learners and a subset of voters are strategic play-
ers knowing the entire game. This would reinforce our results as convergence to the
median would be more forceful.
Second, we could interpret campaigns as persuasive advertising (see Baron (1994) or
Grossman and Helpman (1996)), where voters are either informed about intentions
of candidates or only about historical positions. The closer uninformed voters are
located to the historical position of the candidate, the more eﬀective campaigns become
and the easier voters can be persuaded to support a candidate. This would produce
qualitatively the same result as the ﬁrst approach, which we are using in this paper.
5.2 Campaigns and political outcomes
To deﬁne the contributions of donors, we ﬁrst have to investigate how exogenous
changes in mobility costs aﬀect the candidate equilibrium. Accordingly, we focus on
the political outcome arising from a reduction of mobility costs.7
We begin by examining how a reduction of kc aﬀects the candidate equilibrium. If can-
didate c can reduce the uncertainty surrounding his position, kc will be lowered in the
third stage. Thus, we obtain a new candidate equilibrium with the same characteristics
as in equations (8), (9), and (10), but now featuring new parameters.





kb(ˆ xc − ˆ xb) − fc + fb − 1
4(kb + kc)2
(kb + kc)2 (13)




7We note that the reduction of uncertainty can occur in two ways. First, the ﬂoor uncertainty
represented by the constants fb and fc can be reduced. Second, the direct mobility costs can be
diminished if a candidate leaves his established position. Both possibilities lead to greater mobility
for the candidates and produce qualitatively the same result.


















Thus, if candidate c can reduce mobility costs, we will have a new candidate equilibrium
in which c will be closer to the median because his increased mobility allows him to
gain more voters by approaching the median voter position. In general, candidate b
will be forced to take a more extreme position.
Similarly, we will obtain symmetrical results if candidate b is able to inform the elec-
torate more eﬃciently. Now we need to investigate the candidate equilibrium in the




kc(ˆ xb − ˆ xc) − fc + fb + 1
4(kb + kc)2
(kb + kc)2 (17)

















Hence, if candidate b can improve communication, his position will be drawn toward
the center, and he will win more votes. Thus every candidate has a strong incentive to





10This incentive contrasts with insights in other political competition models in which there may
be a preference for ambiguity when candidates are uncertain about the policy positions preferred by
the median voter. This argument has been developed in an intriguing model by Glazer (1990).
126 Donor and Candidate Equilibrium
6.1 The donor game
We now turn our attention to the incentives faced by political donor groups in the ﬁrst
stage of the electoral game. We assume that there is a ﬁnite number N(N > 2) of donor
groups and that the ideal point of each group can be characterized by the preferred
point of a typical group member equated with the donor. We use xj (j = 1, ..., N)
to denote the corresponding ideal points. We assume that interest groups are ordered
according to their ideal points, i.e. x1 ≤ x2 ≤ ... ≤ xN.
The level of support provided by a donor is determined by the contributions of the
politically active members and is represented as Ej. Ej is the budget the interest
group j has to support candidate j. We use Ejb (Ejc) to denote the support that
candidate b (c) receives from group j. We have Ejb + Ejc = Ej. A donor will spend
money on the candidate who is more likely to improve the donor’s wealth than the
other competitor. Thus we obtain two campaign functions that depend solely on the










The ﬁrst derivatives k′
c and k′
b are negative because more campaign support enables
the candidates to reduce more uncertainty.
We follow a standard assumption that contributors or interest groups are better in-
formed than voters. For simplicity, we assume that donors are fully informed about
the policies candidates will pursue in oﬃce. Hence, contributors observe xb and xc.
Accordingly, the donor group will support b if and only if the contribution of candidate
b leads to a political outcome that is closer to the preferred point than the one arising
from support for candidate c.
6.2 The value of campaign contributions
We determine the value of campaign contributions for an individual donor. For this
purpose, we consider four cases. First we assume that candidate b wins the election
with or without the contribution of a donor j, given the contributions of the other
donor. The value of campaigns for an individual donor j in this case is denoted by
13∆Uj(b)11 and calculated as the diﬀerence between the utility arising from support b


















b − xb) (21)
= (x
′
b − xb)(−xb − x
′
b + 2xj)
If donor j supports candidate b or c, x′
b or xb will be the political outcome, respectively.
From the last section we know that x′
b > xb. Thus ∆Uj(b) is monotonically increasing
with xj, and ∆Uj(b) becomes zero for xj =
x′
b+xb
2 . Hence we conclude that all donors
with an ideal point greater than
x′
b+xb
2 will support candidate b in such cases.
Second, the situation is completely analogous if given the contributions of the other
donors, candidate c wins the election with support (position x′
c) and without support


















c − xc) (22)





From equation (15) we know that x′
c will be smaller than xc. All donors with most-
preferred points less than
x′
c+xc
2 will select candidate c over b for campaign support.
The third and fourth cases concern scenarios where a single donor can aﬀect the political
outcome. These cases will be discussed later.
11The variable b indicates that candidate b wins the election in every case.
146.3 Existence of equilibria
We ﬁnally establish the existence of candidate and donor equilibria, which we call in
the remainder of the paper CD−equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1
A CD−equilibrium are positions {xb,xc}, donor decisions {Ejc}N
j=1 and {Ejb}N
j=1 and
voter decisions such that these strategies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium of
the four-stage game.
We will focus on two types of CD−equilibria. In the ﬁrst CD−equilibrium candidate
b wins and in the CD−equilibrium candidate c wins.
6.3.1 Candidate b wins
We start with the circumstances in which candidate b wins the election. We deﬁne two
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Equation (25) deﬁnes two values for k∗
b and k∗
c that realize if all donors to the right of
x∗
b support candidate b and all donors to the left of x∗
b support candidate c. Formally,







monotonically increasing in x∗
b while k∗
c (x∗
b) is monotonically decreasing in x∗
b.
The left side of (23) is strictly increasing with x∗
b. The right side is monotonically
decreasing with x∗
b, since we know that the lower kc is (or the higher kb), the lower any
equilibrium position of candidate b will be, which is represented by the right side of
formula (23). Moreover, for x∗
b = −A, the left-hand side is smaller than the right-hand
15side as all contributors support candidate b. For x∗
b = 0 we assume that the right-hand
side is smaller than the left-hand side.12 Then, the value x∗
b that solves (23) exists and
is uniquely determined. The arguments are similar for x∗
c.
We obtain two diﬀerent cases for the intersection of the left-hand side of equation (23)







In the second case, x∗
b does not coincide with any ideal point of a donor. Thus, by our
deﬁnition of x∗
b and k∗
c, every donor supports one candidate only. In the ﬁrst case, x∗
b is
exactly the ideal point of a donor whose contributions are not yet included in the cam-
paign functions kb and kc. As this donor is totally satisﬁed with the CD−equilibrium,
we assume that he will refrain from providing any support or he will have to split his
contributions among the candidates in order to ensure that the CD−equilibrium is not
disrupted by his contribution.
x∗
b and x∗
c characterize a situation in which candidate b receives campaign contributions
from all donors with an ideal point greater than x∗
b, whereas candidate c will only be
supported by the rest of the donors.
We next establish
Proposition 2




2 + V c∗−V b∗
2(x∗
c−x∗
b) > 0 and that xind remains positive
(xind > xm = 0) if one donor changes his contribution decision. Then x∗
b and x∗
c
constitute a CD−equilibrium. Candidate b wins the election, and the political
outcome is x∗
b
The assumptions of Proposition 2 can be expressed by the exogenous parameters of
the model. We provide a speciﬁc example in subsection 6.4.













16Proof of Proposition 2:
For x∗
b and x∗
c to be equilibrium values, we have to show that no donor has an incentive
to deviate. If a donor with xj < x∗
b changes his support to candidate b, candidate b still
wins the election and the political outcome would be greater than x∗
b and hence further
away from his own preferred point. For the same reason, a donor with xj > x∗
b will
not want to switch his support from b to c as candidate b continues to win and would
move further away from his prefered position. Therefore, given the contributions of
the other donors, each donor will be worse oﬀ if he deviates. By construction {x∗
b,x∗
c}
is also a candidate equilibrium. Hence x∗
b and x∗
c constitute a CD−equilibrium. The
political outcome is x∗
b.
The intuition for the equilibrium behavior of donors runs as follows: Suppose donors
expect the leftist candidate b to win the election. Then donors to the left of the
winning leftist candidate will give money to the rightist candidate, as this pushes the
equilibrium position of the leftist candidate towards the left. Donors located to the
right of the winning position will support the winner, as this draws his position to the
right.
6.3.2 Candidate c wins




fc − fb + k∗∗
b ˆ xb + k∗∗
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b ˆ xb + k∗∗






































Again, like in the last subsection, the construction ensures that x∗∗
c and x∗∗
b exist and
17are unique. We obtain:
Proposition 3




2 + V c∗∗−V b∗∗
2(x∗∗
c −x∗∗
b ) > 0 and that xind remains positive if one
donor changes his contribution decision. Then x∗∗
b and x∗∗
c constitute a
CD−equilibrium. Candidate c wins the election, and the political outcome is x∗∗
c .
The proof of Proposition 3 follows the same lines as Proposition 2.
6.3.3 Summary
The characteristics of the equilibria are summarized in the following ﬁgure, which
represents the donors’ ideal points, the median voterand the choices of candidates and
donors in the CD−equilibria.
x∗
b xm xind x∗
c
support c support b
x∗
b xind xm x∗
c
support c support b
6.4 An Example
We illustrate the multiplicity of equilibria by an example. Suppose ideal points of
voters are uniformly distributed on [−A,A]. Candidates established positions ˆ xb and
ˆ xc are located symmetrically around the median voter xm = 0 with ˆ xb = xm − ∆ and
ˆ xc = xm + ∆ for some ∆ > 0. Candidates are associated with the same ﬂoor level of
uncertainty if they depart from the established position, i.e. fb = fc = f. Moreover,












= ¯ k − λ
 
Ejb, (29)
18with some parameter λ(λ > 0). For simplicity, all contributors are located at the
median position, i.e. xj = xm,∀j ∈ {1,...,N}. The aggregate amount of campaign
expenditures is denoted by ¯ E =
 N
j=1Ej. We assume ¯ k − λ ¯ E > 0. Then, we obtain
Proposition 4
There exist two CD−equilibria.





λ ¯ E∆ −
(2¯ k−λ ¯ E)2
4





λ ¯ E∆ +
(2¯ k−λ ¯ E)2
4
2¯ k − λ ¯ E
(31)
(ii) In the other CD−equilibrium, all donors support candidate c. Candidate c wins




−λ ¯ E∆ −
(2¯ k−λ ¯ E)2
4





−λ ¯ E∆ +
(2¯ k−λ ¯ E)2
4
2¯ k − λ ¯ E
(33)
The example illustrates how two CD−equilibria emerge. Either donors run to the
support of candidate b ensuring that he wins or they jointly secure the win of candidate
c. In both cases, the support decisions of donors are best responses.
6.5 Discussion of the assumptions and uniqueness
Before we consider further features of these equilibria, we shall ﬁrst discuss the assump-
tions and the uniqueness issue. It is easy to demonstrate that, under the assumptions
of the last section, the derived equilibria are unique. Let us consider, for instance,
a potential CD−equilibrium, say xb and xc, in which candidate b wins the election.
If any donor with an ideal point less than xb supports candidate b, he can increase
his utility by supporting c, which drives the political outcome toward his ideal point.
Similarly, a donor with xj > xb can do no better than to support candidate b in order
to reduce the distance between the political outcome and his preferred point. Thus
under the two assumptions the derived equilibria are unique.
19Next we discuss what happens if one assumption does not hold.
First, we have assumed that the positions x∗
b and x∗∗
c will gain a majority of voters,
respectively. If this condition is not fulﬁlled, we will have only one CD−equilibrium.






c. Candidate c is sure of winning the election in the situation
(x∗∗
b ,x∗∗
c ), as he gains even more votes. Therefore we have at least one CD−equilibrium.





c ), no donor can change the political outcome by changing his de-
cision. Suppose e.g. in a CD−equilibrium characterized by x∗
b and x∗
c, a donor with
xj > x∗
c can ensure that candidate c will win the election with his donations. Then,
he will, of course, select candidate c over b. Hence, in this case (x∗
b,x∗
c) cannot be a
candidate equilibrium. Thus, in general, if a donor is pivotal in a potential equilib-
rium, it will not be a donor equilibrium. But again, if for instance, in (x∗
b,x∗
c) the
majority of voters in favor of candidate b is very small, which will enable one donor to
change the political outcome, the CD−equilibria with (x∗∗
b ,x∗∗
c ), will in general imply
a substantial majority for candidate c. So, as a rule we expect in this case again one
CD−equilibrium to hold if we have enough donors.13
6.6 Implications
The derived CD−equilibria have some remarkable consequences. We now discuss sev-
eral important features of the case when all assumptions hold and both CD−equilibria
exist.
Both candidates have a chance of winning the election that depends on the realization
of the CD−equilibrium. Members of the donor group will support a candidate whose
position is not closest to their own ideal point. In a CD−equilibrium with (x∗
b,x∗
c) on
the other hand, donors with xj < x∗
b will support candidate c, whereas a donor with
xj = x∗
c will contribute to funding of candidate b’s campaign. In any case, however,
donors located around the median will support the winning candidate. If he coincides
with the median voter, the median donor will always contribute to the candidate whose
position is closest to his.
Campaign support increasing the mobility of both candidates leads to a convergence
13Precise conditions can be given when distributions of voters and donors are speciﬁed.





and kc and kb decrease due to advertising.14
This convergence does not end at the median or in equal locations, but the positions
with campaigns are closer than those without campaigns.
Moreover, symmetrical political and support constellations yield asymmetrical out-
comes. Suppose prospective campaign funds are symmetrically distributed around the
median position and ˆ xc = −ˆ xb, fc = fb, and kc = kb without advertising. Then, in a
CD−equilibrium, the candidates do not take up symmetrical positions. By contrast,
in equilibrium one candidate c will win and attract the majority of donors despite the
fact that both candidates are equally attractive at the outset.
A property of the equilibria is that small diﬀerences in candidate positions without
campaigns do not destroy the incentives for donors to contribute, because a reduction
of uncertainty aﬀects the equilibrium positions. Political controversy is not a neces-
sary condition for fundraising, which gives an important twist to the literature (e.g.
Congleton 1989).
The increase of mobility by campaigns does not necessarily imply that voters perceive
lower uncertainty in equilibrium. Let us consider a constellation in which candidate
b is located in his established point ˆ xb without campaigns and wins the election. In
the CD−equilibrium in which b wins, voters will perceive higher uncertainty, since b is
drawn toward the center, which is associated with higher uncertainty compared to the
outcome without campaigns. Thus campaigns that reduce uncertainty can heighten
uncertainty in a CD−equilibrium.
It has been argued that consistent incumbents are perceived as a lottery with smaller
variance than any challenger (e.g. Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985) and Anderson and
Glomm (1992)). This fact can be easily incorporated into our framework. Suppose
candidate c is the incumbent. We assume that ˆ xc = −ˆ xb, fc < fb, and kc < kb
without any campaign support. Then the incumbent will win the election without
campaigns, since equations (6), (8), and (9) imply that xind
i < 0 = xm. But our model
shows that despite this initial advantage there may be a CD−equilibrium in which
the challenger will win the election if he wins over the major part of the donors. This
14This will not be true if the uncertainty ﬂoors of b and c are lowered by campaigns, because in this
case the distance between candidate b and c remains unchanged.
21suggests another way of looking at incumbent/challenger competition characterized by
the diﬃculty of defeating the incumbent. If and only if the challenger is able to organize
donor support much better than the incumbent, will he be able to defeat the incumbent.
Hence the electoral advantage for the incumbent can be suddenly outweighed by a new
organization of donors by the challenger.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have examined a simple model of campaigns in which contributors support can-
didates who can then engage in costly campaigning. We have argued that campaigns
may induce a run by a number of interest groups to support one candidate.
The results in this paper constitute a set of testable propositions pertaining to the
relationships among a set of endogenous variables (candidates’ policies, contribution
decisions, amount of contributions, electoral outcomes, etc.) and a set of exogenous
variables (incumbency advantage, distribution of voters and donors). Moreover, the
model presented in this paper can be extended in several directions. The model could
be complemented by other aspects of campaigns. For instance, interest groups may
contribute money because they receive services or get access to politicians when a can-
didate takes oﬃce. This would tend to increase the incentives of interest groups to
support the winning candidate and would reinforce the run phenomenon. Finally, we
have assumed that candidates only care about winning the election. Suppose we as-
sumed instead that candidates have policy preferences. As shown by Gersbach (1998),
this produces a very diﬀerent distribution of campaign expenditures across winners and
losers. Comparing both models with empirical data could be used to test the objective
functions of candidates, i.e. which objective functions of candidates are consistent with
empirical campaign patterns.
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V c − V b
2(xc − xb)
and from the candidate goals maxxind
i (candidate b) and minxind
i (candidate c).
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Thus the candidates take diﬀerent positions in equilibrium, depending on the mobility
costs.
We insert xc − xb = 1
2(kc + kb) into the ﬁrst ﬁrst-order condition and obtain
1 −
fc − fb + kc
1
2(kb + kc) + kc
 
ˆ xc − xb − 1
2(kb + kc)
 
− kb(xb − ˆ xb)
1





2 = fc − fb − xb(kb + kc) + kcˆ xc + kbˆ xb.
Thus we ﬁnd that
xb =
fc − fb + kbˆ xb + kcˆ xc − 1
4(kb + kc)2
kb + kc
23Because of xc = 1
2(kc + kb) + xb we obtain
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